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Abstract
The simulation hypothesis says that all the materials and events in the reality (including
the universe, our body, our thinking, walking and etc) are computations, and the reality
is a computer simulation program like a video game. All works we do (talking, reasoning,
seeing and etc) are computations performed by the universe-computer which runs the
simulation program.
Inspired by the view of the simulation hypothesis (but independent of this hypothesis),
we propose a new method of logical reasoning named ”Computer-Simulation Model
Theory”, CSMT.
Computer-Simulation Model Theory is an extension of Mathematical Model Theory
where instead of mathematical-structures, computer-simulations are replaced, and the
activity of reasoning and computing of the reasoner is also simulated in the model.
(CSMT) argues that:
for a formula φ, construct a computer simulation model S such that
1- φ does not hold in S, and
2- the reasoner I (human being, the one who lives inside the reality) cannot
distinguish S from the reality (R),
then
I cannot prove φ in reality.
Although CSMT is inspired by the simulation hypothesis, but this reasoning method is
independent of the acceptance of this hypothesis. As we argue in this part, one may do
not accept the simulation hypothesis, but knows CSMT a valid reasoning method.
As an application of Computer-Simulation Model Theory, we study the famous
problem P vs NP. We let φ ≡ [P = NP] and construct a computer simulation model E
such that P = NP does not hold in E.
1 Simulation Hypothesis
Human’s worldview changes with the times. At the time of Omar Khayyam, the industry
was limited to the Pottery, and Omar Khayyam (inspired by the pottery) assumed the
universe as a water vessel and asked ”hey you! where is the potter?”
Our worldview changes as our industry changes and our current industry are artificial
intelligence, virtual reality, robotics, and video games. Using artificial intelligence, we are
going to make new creatures even more intelligent than us. Sophia Robot 2 is one of these
creatures.
So Nick Bostrom (inspired by the computer industry) asks ”Are you living in a computer
simulation?” (see [1]); we might be all creatures in a video game developed by a programmer.
1rramezanian@um.ac.ir, ramezanian@sharif.ir
2https : //en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Sophia(robot)
1
We almost are going to believe this new worldview as Elon Musk says that he feels ”We’re
Probably Living in a Simulation”.
Briefly, the simulation hypothesis is the following sentence
we are living in a simulation program (a video game) which we, inhabitants,
call it Reality. This simulation program is run on a computer device (similar to
your PC or your laptop) which we call it universe-computer (UC).
Regarding reality as a computer simulation means that all we (human beings) do (think-
ing, walking, reasoning, talking, jumping, and etc) are computations and procedures per-
formed by the ”Universe-Computer” (UC). When I think, it is UC that computes, when I
prove a theorem, it is UC that computes, when I breathe, it is again UC, and etc. Physics,
Biology, Logic and etc are all computational process which UC performs.
So, we may name human beings (the one who lives in) to be the computist as his/her
thinking, breathing, walking and etc are all computations done by UC.
In the next section, we discuss our proposed reasoning method CSMT. For justification
of our reasoning method, we do not need the simulation hypothesis to be ”True”, we just
need it to be ”Possible”. So one may do not accept the simulation hypothesis, but accepts
the CSMT as a valid reasoning method.
2 Computer-Simulation Model Theory
Computer-Simulation Model Theory is an extension of the Model Theory [2], where the
reasoner also lives inside the model and is an inhabitant of the model.
Model theory is a branch of mathematical logic that studies that mathematical-structures
satisfy which formulas. Given a set of formulas Γ, and a formula φ, a way to reason that φ is
not logically derivable from Γ is simply by constructing a mathematical-structure M , such
that all formulas in Γ holds in M (M |= Γ) but φ does not hold in the world M (M 6|= φ).
This reasoning is true, because of the soundness of deduction system 3.
In Computer-Simulation Model Theory, instead of mathematical-structure, we deal with
computer-simulations. In model theory, the reasoner (the one who thinks and reasons) is out
of the mathematical-structure, while In CSMT, the reasoner (the one who thinks, computes,
and ...) lives and simulated inside the computer-simulation.
In a computer-simulation model, a formula ψ could be provable for the creator of the
computer-simulation but not provable for the computist. But we assume soundness, that is
if the computist proves a formula φ then the formula is true in the computer-simulation.
The Computer-Simulation Model Theory argues that:
to show that the reasoner (the computist) cannot prove a sentence φ in the
reality (R), construct a computer simulation S such that
(1) the reasoner (computist) cannot distinguish S from the reality (R), and
(2) φ does not hold in S.
3For example, suppose that we want to show that a formula φ is not True for all graphs. We only need
to construct a graph structure which does not satisfy φ.
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If our deduction system is sound then all we prove must hold in reality. So, if S is a
computer simulation that we cannot say whether we live in S or in the reality, then if we
can prove φ in the reality, the statement φ must also be true at S.
Note that our activity of proving and reasoning are computations performed by the UC
of reality. This property differs CSMT from model theory.
The activity of the reasoning and computing of the computist is also performed by the
simulation, and this activity can affect the model.
We are in the age of artificial intelligence, and constructing a computer simulation exactly
similar to the reality is completely plausible. Using artificial intelligence, we can simulate
Physics, Biology, our thinking, our reasoning and etc.
The mathematical Model theory considers the reasoner outside of the model. Model
theory is not a complete and real reasoning method since in reality, we (the reasoner) are
inhabitant and inside the model. In CSMT, an extension of the mathematical model theory,
the process of reasoning is also considered in the model, and this process may affect other
parts of the model.
2.1 Computer-Simulation Model
A computer-simulation model S consists of the three following parts
i. The UC of S.
ii. The Computist.
iii. A set of instruction INST that the computist (the inhabitants in S) interacts with
UC through them. [when we walk, reason, breathe, and etc, we are asking UC to
perform the computation of walking, reasoning, breathing, and etc].
All we do (walking, reasoning, and etc) are procedures performed by UC of the simula-
tion. So, to formally describe a computer-simulation model, we just need to define
• what a procedure is?
• how the computist using the procedures interacts with the UC of the computer-
simulation model?
In the next definitions 2.1, 2.2, and 2.3, we clarify these notions.
Definition 2.1 The UC of a computer-simulation model S is a tuple
U = (TBOX,SBOX, INST,CONF )
where
1. INST is a nonempty set (the set of all instructions), and INST0 ⊆ INST is a
nonempty subset called the set of starting instructions.
2. CONF is a nonempty set called the set of configurations such that to each x ∈ {0, 1}∗,
– a unique configuration C0,x ∈ CONF is associated as the start configuration,
and
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– to each C ∈ CONF , a unique string yC ∈ {0, 1}
∗ is associated.
3. The transition box, TBOX, is a total function from CONF×INST to CONF∪{⊥4}.
The function TBOX is executable by a computer device 5.
4. The successful box, SBOX, is a total function from CONF to {Y ES,NO}. The
function SBOX is executable by a computer device.
Note that when we say a computer-simulation model, then the simulation program of the
model must be executable by a computer device and because of this, two functions SBOX
and TBOX must be executable by a computer device.
Definition 2.2
i. A procedure (an algorithm) is a finite set M ⊆ INST (a finite set of instructions),
satisfying the following condition
The determination condition: for every C ∈ CONF either for all ι ∈ M ,
TBOX(C, ι) = ⊥, or at most there exists one instruction τ ∈ M such that
TBOX(C, ι) ∈ CONF .
We refer to the set of all procedures by the symbol Ξ.
ii. We let υ : Ξ×CONF → INST ∪{⊥} be a total function such that for each procedure
M and C ∈ CONF , if υ(M,C) ∈ INST then
– υ(M,C) ∈M , and
– TBOX(C, υ(M,C)) ∈ CONF .
The function υ controls that which instruction of a procedure M must apply on a given
configuration C.
Definition 2.3 For every computer-simulation model S, we consider the followings to be
true:
c1. Free will of Inhabitants: The computist is free to do the following things in any order
that he wants:
1− he can freely choose an arbitrary instruction ι ∈ INST and an arbitrary config-
uration C ∈ CONF to apply the TBOX on (C, ι), and
2− he can freely choose an arbitrary configuration C ∈ CONF to apply the SBOX
on.
c2. Computable Languages: A string x ∈ Σ∗, Σ = {0, 1}, is in the language of a procedure
M , denoted by L(M), whenever the computist can construct a sequence C0C1, ..., Cn
of configurations in CONF such that
4undefined symbol.
5We assume that the computer device is equipped and extended with memory cards as much as needed
and we never face the shortage of memory, and thus Turing machines are also executable by computer
devices.
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– C0 = C0,x,
– each Ci, i ≥ 1, is obtained by applying TBOX on (Ci−1, υ(M,Ci−1)),
– the SBOX outputs Y ES for Cn,
– and either υ(M,Cn) = ⊥ or TBOX(Cn, υ(M,Cn)) = ⊥.
The computist calls C0C1, ..., Cn the successful computation path of M on x. The
length of a computation path is the number of configurations appeared in.
c3. Computable Functions: A partial function f : Σ∗ → Σ∗, Σ = {0, 1}, is computed by
a procedure M ∈ Ξ, whenever for x ∈ Σ∗, the computist can construct a sequence
C0C1, ..., Cn of configurations in CONF such that
– C0 = C0,x,
– each Ci, i ≥ 1, is obtained by applying TBOX on (Ci−1, υ(M,Ci−1)),
– the SBOX outputs Y ES for Cn,
– and either υ(M,Cn) = ⊥ or TBOX(Cn, υ(M,Cn)) = ⊥,
– yCn = f(x).
c4. Parallel use of UC: The computist may start to apply the UC on a procedure M and
a string x, however, he does not have to keep on the computation until the successful
box outputs Y es. The computist can leave the computation M on x at any stage of
his activity and choose freely any other procedure M ′ and any other string x′ to apply
UC on them.
c5. Time Complexity: The time complexity of computing a procedure M on an input
string x, denoted by timeM (x), is n, for some n ∈ N, whenever the computist con-
structs a successful computation path of the syntax-procedure M on x with length n.
c6. Time Complexity: Let f : N → N and L ⊆ Σ∗. The computist says that the time
complexity of the computation of the language L is less than f whenever there exists a
procedure M ∈ Ξ such that the language defined by the computist via M , i.e., L(M),
is equal to L, and for all x ∈ L, timeM (x) < f(|x|).
c7. Complexity Classes: The computist defines the time complexity class P ⊆ 2Σ
∗
to be
the set of all languages that he/she can computes in polynomial time. He/She also
defines the complexity class NP ⊆ 2Σ
∗
as follows:
L ∈ NP iff there exists J ∈ P and a polynomial function q such that for all
x ∈ Σ∗,
x ∈ L⇔ ∃y ∈ Σ∗(|y| ≤ q(|x|) ∧ (x, y) ∈ J).
c8. Turing Computability: The UC of the simulation is sufficiently powerful such that
the computist can compute all partial recursive (Turing computable) function using
the UC. That is, for every Turning machine T , there exists a procedure M ∈ Ξ that
is L(M) = L(T ).
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c9. Black Box: The computist lives inside the simulation S and does not access to the
structure of TBOX and SBOX. For the computist, TBOX and SBOX are black
boxes.
c10. Deduction System: There exist a procedure G ∈ Ξ such that for every proof z, and
every formula ψ, G(〈z, ψ′〉) = 1 means z is the proof of ψ. The computist using the
procedure G does his logical reasoning. Note that the procedure G is also computed by
the universe-computer UC.
c11. Soundness: If the computist can prove a sentence φ, then φ is True in the simulation.
c12. The universe-computer of the simulation, UC, works in linear time. Also, the com-
putist knows that the UC works in linear time. There exists a universal clock in the
simulation S, shown by ClockS, such that the computist uses it and measures passing
time. That is when the computist insert a configuration C to SBOX (TBOX) the
number of clocks of ClockS that the computist waits to receive the output is linear with
respect to the length of C.
In c10, we insist on proof procedure G, we could similarly talk about ”walking pro-
cedure”, ”breathing procedure” and etc, but we disregard them as we aim to construct a
counter-model for [P = NP]. As an example of a computer-simulation model, one may see
the example 7.1.
2.2 Indistinguishability
In the following definitions, we formally describe ”indistinguishability” between computer-
simulation models.
Definition 2.4 Suppose S is a simulation and M is a procedure in S. The experience of
the computist on the procedure M , denoted by EXPS(M), is defined to be the set of all
pairs (x, y) where the computist ran procedure M on input x and received output y. Note
that always, EXPS(M) is a finite set (although new pairs are always added to it) since, at
each stage of time, the computist could only run the procedure on only finite inputs.
Definition 2.5 Suppose S and S′ are two computer-simulation model where UC is the
universe-computer of S and UC ′ is the universe-computer of S′. We say that the computist
A who is an inhabitant in S cannot say if he lives inside S or S′, S ∼A S
′, whenever
1- INSTS = INSTS′ ,
2- At each stage of time, the computist A based on his experiences of the procedures
cannot say that the universe-computer of S is UC or UC ′.
We formally defined what we mean by a computer-simulation model and indistinguisha-
bility of models. In computer-simulation model theory, CSMT, the reasoner (the computist)
is also involved in the model. To show the usefulness and importance of CSMT, we study
the famous problem P vs NP. Using CSMT, in the following of this paper, we show that
there exists no proof for P = NP.
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• We introduce two notions: non-predetermined functions and persistently evolutionary
Turing machines.
• We construct a computer simulation world, named E, which P 6= NP in this world.
The UC of E is a persistently evolutionary Turing machine.
• We discuss that the reality is not distinguishable from a persistently evolutionary
model.
References
[1] N. Bostrom, Are you living in a computer simulation, Philosophical Quarterly, Vol. 53,
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3 Non-predetermined functions
The most important and fundamental notion of mathematics is function. A function is a
process associating each element x of a set X, to a single element f(x) of another set Y .
Classically, we assumed that all functions in mathematics are pre-determined.
In this section, we discuss functions that are not pre-determined and they are eventually
determined through the way we start to associate f(x) for every element x ∈ X.
We introduce Persistently Evolutionary Turing machines that compute non-predetermined
functions.
We also discuss that if the UC of our reality persistently evolves then our reality will have
alternate (alternate realities are worlds that could exist next to, in parallel of, or in place
of our own, if we interacted with the world differently).
Let f be a process that associates elements of a set X to the elements of another set Y .
If the process f works well-defined then we know f as a mathematical function. But being
well-defined does not force the process f to be predetermined.
Suppose that x1 and x2 are two different elements of X. I want to use the process f to
determine the value of f for x1 and x2. It is up to me to first perform the process f on x1
or x2.
If f is predetermined the it does not matter to perform the process on ordering x1x2 or
ordering x2x1. But if f is non-predetermined then different order of inputs causes different
alternate functions which one of them is the function that we are constructing.
Alternate functions are functions that could exist in place of our function (if we inter-
acted with different ordering of inputs, those alternate could happen).
For example, consider the following process g:
• W is a set which is initially empty.
• for a given natural number n, if there exists a pair (n, z) ∈ W then output g(n) = z,
else update W =W ∪ {(n, |W |+ 1)} and output g(n) = |W |+ 1.
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The function g is a non-predetermined function over natural numbers. I input 7, 9, 1, 11
and the process will associates the following: g(7) = 1, g(9) = 2, g(1) = 3, and g(11) = 4.
The value of other numbers are yet non-predetermined and as soon as I perform process g
on each number the value is determined.
- The function g is not predetermined. It is determined eventually, but it is always
undetermined for some numbers.
- The function g is well-defined, and associates to each input a single output.
- For every natural number, the function g is definable.
- If I inputted 9, 1, 7, 11, I would have an alternate g which would associate: g(9) = 1,
g(1) = 2, g(7) = 3, and g(11) = 4.
4 Persistently Evolutionary Turing machines
Persistently Evolutionary Turing machines are an extension of the notion of Turing machines
in which the structure of the machine can evolve through each computation.
A Turing machine consists of a set of states Q, and a table of transitions δ which both
are fixed and remain unchanged forever. In Persistently Evolutionary Turing machines, we
allow the set of states and the table of transitions changes through each computation.
As a Persistently Evolutionary Turing Machine PT computes on an input string x,
the machine PT can add or remove some of its states and transitions, and thus after the
computation on the input x is completed, the sets Q and δ changed.
However these changes are persistent, that is, if we already input a string x and the
machine outputs y, then whenever we again input x the machine outputs the same y, and
the changes of states and transitions does not violate well-definedness.
One may consider that we have a BOX and we set a Turing machine in the box with
some rules of adding and removing of states and transitions. Then, We input strings to
the BOX and for each string, the BOX outputs a single string. The machine in the BOX
changes itself but the behavior of the BOX is well-defined.
Persistently Evolutionary Turing Machines computes non-predetermined functions.
In the following example, we introduce a persistently evolutionary nondeterministic
finite automate [2].
Example 4.1 (In the sequel of the paper, we will refer to the persistently evolutionary
machine introduced in this example by PT1).
Define Evolve : NFA1 × Σ
∗ → NFA1 as follows
6:
Let M ∈ NFA1, M = 〈Q, q0,Σ = {0, 1}, δ : Q × Σ → Q,F ⊆ Q〉
7, and x ∈ Σ∗. Suppose
x = a0a1 · · · ak where ai ∈ Σ. Applying the automata M on x, one of the three following
cases may happen:
6NFA1 is the class of all nondeterministic finite automata M = 〈Q,Σ = {0, 1}, δ, q0, F 〉, where for each
state q ∈ Q, and a ∈ Σ, there exists at most one transition from q with label a.
7F is the set of accepting states
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case1. The automata M reads all a0, a1 · · · , ak successfully and stops in an accepting state.
In this case, the structure of the automata does not change and let Evolve(M,x) =M .
case2. The automata M reads all a0, a1 · · · , ak successfully and stops in a state p which is
not an accepting state.
– If the automata M can transit from the state p to an accepting state by reading
one alphabet, then let Evolve(M,x) =M .
– If it cannot transit (from p to an accepting state) then let Evolve(M,x) to be a
new automata M ′ = 〈Q, q′0,Σ = {0, 1}, δ
′ : Q′×Σ→ Q′, F ′ ⊆ Q′〉, where Q′ = Q,
δ′ = δ, F ′ = F ∪ {p}.
case3. The automata M cannot read all a0, a1 · · · , ak successfully,and after reading a part of
x, say a0a1 · · · ai, 0 ≤ i ≤ k, it crashes in a state q that δ(q, ai+1) is not defined. In this
case, we let Evolve(M,x) be a new automata M ′ = 〈Q, q′0,Σ = {0, 1}, δ
′ : Q′ × Σ →
Q′, F ′ ⊆ Q′〉, where Q′ = Q∪{si+1, si+2, · · · , sk} (all si+1, si+2, · · · , sk are new states
that does not belong to Q), δ′ = δ∪{(q, ai+1, si+1), (si+1, ai+2, si+2), · · · , (sk−1, ak, sk)},
and F ′ = F ∪ {sk}.
The machine PT1 persistently evolve, that is, if it (rejected) accepted a string x already,
then it would (reject) accept the string x for any future trials as well. The language L(M)
is not predetermined and it eventually is determined.
For example, assume that initially M is Q = {q0}, F = ∅, δ = ∅. Now I input the string
101 and according to case 3, the machineM evolves and new states q1, q2, q3 and transitions
(q0, 1, q1), (q1, 0, q2), (q2, 1, q3) are added and also F = F ∪ {q3}. Now if I input the string
10 then according to case 2, M rejects it. However, If at first I inputted 10 to the machine
then it would accept it.
4.1 Time complexity of Evolutionary Turing machines
The time-complexity [1] of Persistent Evolutionary Turing Machines is defined similar to
the time-complexity of Turing machines except that for each (adding) removing of states
or transitions, we count one extra clock.
Proposition 4.2 The time complexity of the machine PT1 in example 4.1 is linear.
Proof. It is straightforward. ⊣
4.2 Executable By Computer Devices
Persistently Evolutionary Turing machines (similar to Turing machines) are executable by
computer devices if as soon as the device needed extra memory resources, we are ready to
add memory cards to the motherboard of the device.
Two simulations V and E introduced in example 7.1, and in definition 7.4 are computer
simulations. The SBOX and TBOX of the V are Turing computable and the SBOX and
TBOX od E are Persistently Evolutionary Turing computable.
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5 Alternate Reality
Alternate realities are worlds that could exist next to, in parallel of, or in place of our own,
if we interacted with the world differently.
If the UC of our reality persistently evolves then we have alternate realities. If this
morning, I first had breakfast and then washed my hands, I would be in another alternate
reality, but since I first washed my hands and then had breakfast, I am in the alternate
world which we call it ”reality”.
Although there are lots of alternate realities, only one of them is actualized. UC evolves
as human beings (the one who lives in this simulation) interact with it. The future is not
predetermined and via our interactions, we always are moving to new alternate realities.
References
[1] S. Arora, B. Barak, Computational Complexity, a modern approach. Cambridge
University Press, 2007.
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6 P = NP Contradicts with Non-predeterminism
In following, I construct a computer simulation and show that in this simulation P is not
equal to NP.
As, we discussed the first section, assuming that the reality is a computer simulation
then all we (human beings) do (thinking, walking, reasoning, talking, jumping, and etc)
are procedures performed by a computer, which we called it ”Universe-Computer” (UC).
When I think, it is UC that computes, when I prove a theorem, it is UC that computes,
when I breathe, it is UC, and etc. Physics, Biology, Logic and etc are all computational
process which UC performs. So, we may name human beings (the one who lives in) to be
the computist as his/her thinking, breathing, walking and etc are all computations done by
UC.
What if UC persistently evolves? Then multiverse and alternate realities are possible
(see section 5), and it is not predetermined that we are moving to which alternate realities,
and future alternate realities are eventually determined by our interaction with UC.
In the next section, we construct a computer simulation that its UC persistently evolves
and it is not predetermined that what alternate realities happen as we move to the future.
We show that P = NP contradicts with non-predeterminism and thus in this simulation P
is not equal to NP.
7 A Computer Simulation which P = NP does not hold in
According to the reasoning method CSMT, If we want to show that P = NP is not provable,
we need to construct a simulation such that
1. we (as the one who lives in) cannot distinguish the simulation from the reality.
10
2. P = NP does not hold in the simulation
We first, in example 7.1, introduce a computer-simulation model named V . Then in
definition 7.4, we slightly change the UC of V and construct a computer-simulation model
named E which its UC persistently evolves. Then in theorem 7.9, we prove that P 6= NP
in E.
Example 7.1 We introduce a computer-simulation model V as follows:
Let
QT = {h} ∪ {qi | i ∈ N ∪ {0}},
Σ,Γ be two finite set with Σ ⊆ Γ and
Γ has a symbol △ ∈ Γ−Σ.
The UC of the simulation V , Uv = (TBOXv, SBOXv, INSTv, CONFv) is defined as
follows:
1) INSTv = {[(q, a)→ (p, b,D)] | p, q ∈ QT , a, b ∈ Γ,D ∈ {R,L}},
(INSTv)0 = {[(q, a)→ (p, b,D)] ∈ INSTs | q = q0}, and
2) CONFv = {(q, xaz) | q ∈ QT , x, z ∈ Γ
∗, a ∈ Γ}, for each x ∈ Σ∗, C0,x = (q0,△x),
and for each C = (q, xaz) ∈ CONFs, yC = xaz.
Note that the programming language of Uv is exactly the standard syntax of configurations
and transition functions of Turing machines.
3) Let C = (q, xb1ab2y) be an arbitrary configuration then
– TBOXv(C, [(q, a) → (p, c,R)]) is defined to be C
′ = (p, xb1cb2y),
– TBOXv(C, [(q, a) → (p, c, L)]) is defined to be C
′ = (p, xb1cb2y), and
– for other cases TBOXv is defined to be ⊥.
4- Let C ∈ CONFv be arbitrary
– if C = (h,△x) then SBOXv(C) is defined to be Y ES,
– if C = (h, x△) then SBOXv(C) is defined to be Y ES, and
– otherwise SBOXv(C) is defined to be NO.
5- For each M ∈ Ξv, and C = (q, xay) ∈ CONFv, if there exists [(q, a)→ (p, b,D)] ∈M
for some p ∈ QT , b ∈ Γ, and D ∈ {R,L}, then υ(M,C) is defined to be [(q, a) →
(p, b,D)] else it is defined to be ⊥.
Theorem 7.2 Accepting the Church-Turing thesis, the computist in the simulation V , can
compute all the procedures that we (human beings) can compute in reality 8.
8If we accept Church-Turing thesis, all the procedures in the reality are Turing computable.
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1- For each procedure M ∈ Ξv, there exists a Turing machine T such that for every
x ∈ Σ∗, x ∈ L(M) and timeM (x) = n iff x ∈ L(T ) and timeT (x) = n.
2- For each Turing machine T , there exists a procedure M ∈ Ξs, such that for every
x ∈ Σ∗, x ∈ L(T ) and timeT (x) = n iff x ∈ L(M) and timeM (x) = n.
Proof. It is straightforward for us not for the computist who lives inside the simulation
V .⊣
We as the one who creates the simulation V can prove the above theorem since we know
the inner structure of TBOXv and SBOXv. The computist who lives inside the simulation
cannot be aware of the above theorem as he does not have access to the inner structure of
the UV. However, he/she is always free to propose a thesis about his/her world (simulation)
similar to what we did, and named it Church-Turing thesis 9.
Definition 7.3 A UC, U = (TBOX,SBOX, INST,CONF ) is called to be static, when-
ever the inner structure of two boxes TBOX and SBOX does not change due to interaction
with the computist. It is called persistently evolutionary whenever the inner structure of at
least one boxes changes but persistently, i.e., in the way that the boxes work well-defined.
The UC defined in the example 7.1 is static.
Definition 7.4 We introduce a computer simulation E which the UC of E,
Ue = (TBOXe, SBOXe, INSTe, CONFe)
is defined as follows.
Two sets INSTe and CONFe are defined to be the same INSTs and CONFs in
example 7.1 respectively, and consequently the set of procedures of the Ue, i.e., Ξe is
the same Ξs.
The transition box TBOXe is also defined similar to the transition box TBOXs in
example 7.1.
The successful box SBOXe is defined as follows: let C ∈ CONFe be arbitrary
– if C = (h,△x) then SBOXs(C) = Y ES,
– if C = (h, x△) then the SBOXe works exactly similar to the the persistently
evolutionary machine PT1 introduced in example 4.1. On input x, if PT1 outputs
1, the successful box outputs Y ES, and
– otherwise SBOXe(C) = NO.
Proposition 7.5 Computer-simulations E and V satisfies conditions c1 − c12 of defini-
tion 2.3.
9 Note that we (the human beings) do not have access to the inner structure of the reality, we call the
Church Turing statement to be a thesis.
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Proof. We only need to discuss c12 for the simulation E. By proposition 4.2, the UC of E
works in linear time. ⊣
Note that the SBOXe of the Ue is a persistently evolutionary machine. For the com-
putist the set of procedures (algorithms) in the simulation E is the same set of procedures
in the simulation V , i.e Ξv = Ξe. However for some procedures, say M , the language L(M)
is the simulation E could be different from the language L(M) in V . For some M ∈ Ξe,
we have L(M) is a non-predetermined language. The procedure M is fixed and does not
change through time, but since the structure of UC (SBOXe) changes through time.
The computist in the simulation E thinks that everything is static since the structure of
the procedure does not change and the computist also does not have access to the structure
of the UC of the simulation.
Theorem 7.6 Every recursively enumerable language can be computed in the environment
Ee. That is, for every recursively enumerable language L, there exists M ∈ Ξe such that
L = L(M).
Proof. It is straightforward. For each Turing machine T , one may construct a procedure
M ∈ Ξe such that L(T ) = L(M). ⊣
Proposition 7.7 The complexity class P is a subset of PE.
Proof. It is straightforward.⊣
The converse of Theorems 7.6, and 7.7 do not hold true. In the simulation E, the
computist can compute some languages in polynomial time which are not predetermined
(see the proof of theorem 7.9).
The item c1 of definition 2.3 says that the computist is free in the way of his/her
interactions with the UC. In the simulation E, the UC is a persistently evolutionary machine
and based on different orderings of the interactions of the computist, we would have different
alternate futures.
Definition 7.8 We say a function f : N → N is sub-exponential, whenever there exists
t ∈ N such that for all n > t, f(n) < 2n.
Theorem 7.9 In the simulation E,
NPE 6= PE.
That is, there exists a procedure M ∈ Ξe such that
• the language L(M) that the computist computes through M is not predetermined,
• the language L(M) belongs to the class PE,
• there exists no procedure M ′ ∈ Ξe, such that L(M
′) is equal to L′ = {x ∈ Σ∗ | ∃y(|y| =
|x| ∧ y ∈ L(M))}, and for some k ∈ N, for all x ∈ L(M ′), if |x| > k then
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timeM (x) ≤ f(|x|)
where f : N → N is a sub-exponential function. In other world, L′ is in NPE but not
in PE.
Proof. Consider the following procedure M ∈ Ξe
Σ = {0, 1},Γ = {0, 1,△},
M = {[(q0,△)→ (h,△, R)], [(h, 0) → (h, 0, R)], [(h, 1) → (h, 1, R)]}.
The language of the procedureM , L(M), is not predetermined in simulation E. That is, as
the computist chooses a string x ∈ Σ∗ to check whether x is an element of L(M), the inner
structure of the universe-computer, Ue evolves. Depending on the ordering of the strings,
says x1, x2, ..., that the computist chooses to check whether xi ∈ L(M) the language L(M)
eventually is determined.
It is obvious that the language L(M) belongs to PE (due to the definition of time
complexity in definition 2.3).
Let L′ = {x ∈ Σ∗ | ∃y(|y| = |x| ∧ y ∈ L(M))}. It is again obvious that L′ belongs to
NPE .
Suppose there exists a procedure M ′ ∈ Ξe that the computist can compute L
′ by M ′
in time complexity less than a sub-exponential function f . Then for some k ∈ N, for all x
with length greater than k, x belongs to L′ whenever
the computist constructs a successful computation path C0,xC1,x, ..., Cn,x of the pro-
cedure M ′ on x, for some n ≤ f(|x|).
Let m1 ∈ N be the maximum length of those strings y ∈ Σ
∗ that until now are accepted
by the persistently evolutionary machine PT1 (see example 4.1) which is inside the SBOXe
of Ue. Define m = max(m1, k).
For every y ∈ Σ∗, let path(y) := C0,yC1,y, ..., Cf(|y|),y be the computational path of the
procedure M ′ on the string y. The path(y) is generated by the transition box of Ue. Let
S(y) = {Cj,y | Cj,y ∈ path(y) ∧ ∃x ∈ Σ
∗(Ci,y = (h, x△))}
and
H(y) = {x ∈ Σ∗ | ∃Cj,y ∈ path(y)(Cj,y = (h, x△))}
We refer by |H(y)| to the number of elements of H(y), we have |H(y)| ≤ f(|y|) if |y| > k.
Also let E(y) = H(y) ∩ {x ∈ Σ∗ | |x| = |y|}, and D(y) = H(y) ∩ {x ∈ Σ∗ | |x| = |y|+ 2}.
Let w ∈ Σ∗ with |w| > m be arbitrary. Two cases are possible: either S(w) = ∅ or S(w) 6= ∅.
Consider the first case. S(w) = ∅.
The computist wants to check if the string w is in L(M ′), and the UC of the simulation
E, that is Ue, works on (the procedure M
′ and the string w), to compute whether w is in
L(M ′) or not. Since the set S(w) is empty, the execution of M ′ on w does not make the
SBOXe to evolve, and it remains unchanged.
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• If the computist in the simulation E, computes that w ∈ L(M ′) then it means that
there exists a string v ∈ Σ∗ such that
|v| = |w| and v ∈ L(M) (∗).
(i) Since the computist has the free will (see c1 of definition 2.3), he first starts to
computes procedure M on all strings in Σ∗ with length |v| + 1 sequentially. As
the length of v is greater than m, all strings with length |v|+ 1 are accepted by
the persistently evolutionary Turing machine PT1 (see item-3 of example 4.1)
which is inside SBOXe.
(ii) Then the computist checks that whether v is L(M). But because of the evolution
of SBOXe happened in part (i), the UC on the computation of M on v outputs
NO, and thus v is not an element of L(M) in the simulation E (see the item-2
of example 4.1). So v 6∈ L(M), and it contradicts with (∗).
• If the computist in the simulation E, computes that w 6∈ L(M ′) then it means that
for all strings v ∈ Σ∗, |v| = |w|, we have v 6∈ L(M). But it contradicts with the free
will of the computist again. As the length w is greater than m, the computist may
choose a string z with |z| = |w| and by the item-3 of example 4.1, we have z ∈ L(M),
contradiction.
Consider the second case. S(w) 6= ∅.
Suppose that the computist, before computingM ′ on w, starts to compute the procedure
M on all strings v0’s, for all v ∈ E(w), and then computes procedure M on all strings v0’s,
for all v ∈ D(w) respectively.
Since |w| > m, the computist have u0 ∈ L(M) for all u ∈ E(w)∪D(w), and SBOXe of
Ue evolves through computingM on u0’s. The UC evolves in the way that SBOXe outputs
No for all configuration in
{Ci,w ∈ S(w) | ∃x ∈ E(w) ∪D(w)(Ci,w = (h, x△))}.
After that, the computist starts to compute M ′ on w. Either the computist finds
w ∈ L(M ′) or w 6∈ L(M ′).
• Suppose the first case happens and w ∈ L(M ′). It contradicts with the free will of
the computist. The computist computes M on all strings v0, |v| = |w| sequentially,
and would make {v0 ∈ Σ∗ | |v| = |w|} ⊆ L(M). Then the SBOXe evolves in the way
that, it will output No for all configurations (h, v△), |v| = |w|, and thus there would
exist no v ∈ L(M) ∩ {x ∈ Σ∗ | |x| = |w|} which implies w 6∈ L(M ′), contradiction.
• Suppose the second case happens and w 6∈ L(M ′). Since |H(w)| < f(|w|) < 2|w|,
during the computation of M ′ on w, only f(|w|) numbers of configurations of the
form (h, x△), x ∈ {v0 | |v| = |w|} ∪ {v1 | |v| = |w|} are given as input to the
SBOXe. Therefore there exists a string z ∈ {x ∈ Σ
∗ | |x| = |w|} such that none of
its successors have been input to the persistently evolutionary Turing machine PT1,
and if the computist chooses z and computes M on it, then z ∈ L(M) which implies
w ∈ L′. Contradiction.
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We showed that L′ cannot be computed by any M ′ that its time complexity is less that
a sub-exponential function. Thus L′ does not belong to the class P. But because of the
procedure M , we have L′ belongs to NP and therefore in the simulation E,
P 6= NP.
⊣
Note that the proof of Theorem 7.9 cannot be carried by the computist who lives in
the environment. The above proof is done by us (the creator of the simulation E). The
theorem simply says that if L′ belongs to NPE then it forces the computist to interacts
with the UC of the simulation E in some certain orders, which conflicts with the item c1
of definition 2.3.
8 Reality is not distinguishable from a Persistently Evolu-
tionary Simulation Model
We, inhabitants of reality, can never find out whether the reality persistently evolves or
not. We can never discover that whether the UC of the reality is a Turing machine or a
Persistently Evolutionary Turing machine.
In previous sections, we introduce two computer simulations E and V which the set
of their procedures are the same, i.e., Ξv = Ξe. The UC of V is static and the UC of E
persistently evolves, though the computist cannot be aware that whether the UC of V (E)
is static or persistently evolves.
Procedures in the simulation E (procedures in the set Ξe) are fixed and do not change,
but for some M ∈ Ξe, we have L(M) is non-predetermined due to the evolution of the UC
of E (see 7.9). We as the creator of the simulation E, we know that the language of the
procedure M in the proof of 7.9 is non-predetermined but the computist who lives inside E
cannot be sure that L(M) is not predetermined and he/she may think that L(M) is static.
We are also the computist of reality, and we do not have access to the UC of reality.
The UC of reality is a black box for us. Actually, the UC of any computer simulation (video
game) is a black box for its inhabitants.
The set of the procedures of the reality is the set of all Turing machines, i.e. Ξreality is
the set of all Turing machines.
The structure of Turing machines is fixed and does not change through computations
(similar to the procedures of simulations V and E), but we (human beings, inhabitants of
the reality) cannot be sure that the language of Turing machines are predetermined.
At any moment of time, we only interact with a finite number of times with the UC,
and based on a finite number of interactions, it is not possible to discover that if the UC is
static or persistently evolves.
Definition 8.1 (BLACK BOX). Let X and Y be two sets,
• an input-output black box B, for an observer, is a box that
– The observer does not see the inner instruction of the box, and
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– the observer chooses elements in X, and input them to the box, and receives
elements in Y as output.
• We say an input-output black box B behaves well-defined whenever if the observer
inputs x0 to the black box, and the black box outputs y0 at a stage of time, then
whenever in future if the observer inputs the same x0 again, the black box outputs the
same y0.
• We say a well-defined black box is static (not order-sensitive) whenever for all n ∈ N,
for every x1, x2, ..., xn ∈ X, for every permutation σ on {1, 2, ..., n}, if the observer
inputs x1, x2, ..., xn respectively to B once, and receives y1 = Bx1, y2 = Bx2, ..., yn =
Bxn, and then we reset the black box. After resetting, if the observer inputs xσ(1), xσ(2),..., xσ(n)
respectively to B, then the outputs of B for each xi would be the same already output
yi, before reset.
• If an observer cannot reset a black box B, then he/she can never discover whether the
black box is static or order-sensitive.
Proposition 8.2
• For every finite sets of pairs S = {(ik, ok) | 1 ≤ k ≤ n, n ∈ N, ik, ok ∈ Σ
∗}, there exists
a Turing machine T such that for all (ik, ok) ∈ S, if we give ik as an input to T , the
Turing machine T outputs ok.
• For every finite sets of pairs S = {(ik, ok) | 1 ≤ k ≤ n, n ∈ N, ik, ok ∈ Σ
∗}, there exists
a Persistent evolutionary Turing machine N such that for all (ik, ok) ∈ S, if we give
ik as an input to N , the Persistent evolutionary machine N outputs ok.
Proof. It is straightforward. ⊣
Corollary 8.3 Let B be an input-output black box for an observer. At each stage of time,
the observer has observed only a finite set of input-output pairs. By the previous proposition,
at each stage of time, the observer knows both the following cases to be possible:
1- There exists a Turing machine inside the black box B.
2- There exists a Persistent evolutionary Turing machine inside the black Box B.
Therefore, We (which do not have access to the UC of the reality) can never discover
that whether the UC of the reality is static or order-sensitive and persistently evolves.
The UC of the simulation E (SOBXe and TBOXe) works in linear time. As we do not
have access to the inner side of the UC of reality, we cannot say whether the ”successful
box” of the reality evolves or not. The universe-computer, UC, of the reality is a linear-time
oracle for us (as the computist), and a linear-time oracle does not affect complexity classes.
We can never distinguish the reality from E.
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9 Conclusion
1- We introduced a new method of reasoning named CSMT.
2- We constructed a computer simulation E which its universe-computer, UC, persis-
tently evolves.
3- We proved, in the computer simulation E, P is not equal to NP. The simulation E is
a counter-model for P = NP.
4- We (who lives in the reality) does not have access to the UC of the reality, it is a black
box for us, and we can never discover that whether the UC of the reality is static or
persistently evolves.
5- We cannot prove P = NP, since if we could prove P = NP, then we could discover
that the UC of the reality does not persistently evolve, it contradicts with item 4.
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